(By You Yunting) Memory chip and storage prices have surged sharply this year. In response, several U.S. computer retailers and consumers have filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, accusing Micron, Samsung, and SK Hynix of colluding to monopolize the market. Upon reviewing the complaint, we found that the market monopoly not only from the three giants’ coordinated actions, but also from weakened competition caused by U.S. sanctions on China, with Micron’s lobbying playing a clear role behind those sanctions. We will analyze this situation and discuss what legal tools are available under Chinese laws to protect our rights and take countermeasures.
1. What Does the Complaint Allege?
This class-action lawsuit targets the world’s top three memory manufacturers, which together control about 90% of the global market. The plaintiffs allege that the three companies formed an illegal cartel (a price-fixing alliance), to jointly restrict supply and manipulate prices in the conventional memory market. This market covers all JEDEC standard memory chips, including DDR3, DDR4, and DDR5 for computers, LPDDR4, LPDDR5, and LPDDR5X for mobile phones and thin-and-light laptops, and GDDR6, GDDR7 for graphics cards, but not High Bandwidth Memory (HBM). The core arguments of the complaint are as follows
The plaintiffs allege that the three defendants used the AI boom, specifically the surging demand for HBM, as a pretext to simultaneously slash production of mainstream conventional memory chips (DDR3 and DDR4). This coordinated cutback has artificially created a severe shortage. Over the past four years, prices for conventional memory have skyrocketed by about 700%. Yet the per-chip profit margin for HBM is actually lower than for mature commodity-grade memory. So, giving up high-profit conventional lines for lower-margin HBM lines only makes economic sense if the three rivals tacitly agree to cut back together.
The complaint lists multiple parallel and coordinated moves: simultaneous production cuts; a joint shift of capacity from conventional memory to HBM; coordinated withdrawal from or reduction of conventional memory output; collectively reserving massive capacity for the Stargate Project; coordinating customer order reviews and controls; aligning public positions via earnings calls and abandoning competitive differentiation; and prioritizing dividends over supply expansion. These moves have sent conventional memory prices soaring (contract prices up ~697%, retail prices doubling or more), creating artificial shortages and rationing.
These three companies have a prior record of collusive market monopoly. Between 1998 and 2002, Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron conspired to fix memory module prices and overcharge U.S. computer manufacturers. They were criminally prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice. Samsung pleaded guilty and paid $300 million; SK Hynix received a fine of $185 million, with several executives jailed. Micron escaped punishment by whistle-blowing on the cartel.
2. Price Hikes Are Linked to U.S. Crackdown on Chinese Memory Manufacturers
Nonetheless, the price hikes do have demand-side drivers, so the defendants have plausible defenses. Shifting to HBM is an independent commercial decision to pursue high-value products; cutting production is a reasonable measure to stem losses from a weak market; restricting supply may result from objective equipment bottlenecks and technical barriers rather than deliberate curbs; and strict customer order reviews aim to prevent malicious stockpiling by downstream enterprises. While these commercial justifications have some merit, another point in the complaint stands out: the DRAM industry’s near-total lack of new entrants is partly due to long-standing U.S. restrictions on Chinese memory makers’ access to advanced equipment.
The complaint cites “Fabrication Barriers to Entry” (FBE) : building a fab costs $15–20 billion, and reaching competitive scale requires $30–50 billion, out of reach for newcomers. The core equipment like ASML’s EUV lithography machines are scarce, pre-booked for years by existing industry giants, forcing new players to wait years. Memory module manufacturing requires complex technical know-how and process experience that takes 5 to 10 years to master. Even if chips are produced, entering major clients’ supply chains takes another 12–18 months of certification, with no steady revenue during that time.
Such high barriers have consolidated a stable market structure for Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron, who face no threat from new players increasing memory module supply to lower prices. And the absence of new competitors is largely tied to the U.S. suppression of China’s chip sectors.
In 2022 and 2023, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued several comprehensive semiconductor export controls, blocking Chinese enterprises from obtaining advanced chip manufacturing equipment, especially EUV lithography machines essential for the mass production of current-generation memory modules like DDR5, LPDDR5X, GDDR7 and HBM.
For instance, China’s ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), once seen as a potential fourth supplier that could break the oligopoly, has been severely impacted by U.S. sanctions. The U.S. government has imposed strict export controls on CXMT and other Chinese semiconductor enterprises, including Entity List designation and technology bans, which cut Chinese enterprises off from core equipment and intellectual property rights such as EDA software and lithography machines required for advanced memory production. As a result, CXMT’s ability to further develop and mass produce HBM has been severely weakened.
3. Micron’s Advocacy for Further Sanctions Against Chinese Enterprises
Behind these U.S. sanctions, their domestic corporate advocacy is a key driver. According to a Reuters report in April 2026, Micron, one of the three giants, is actively pushing Congress to pass the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH Act) , which would further restrict Chinese competitors’ access to chip equipment. The proposed bill would widen sales restrictions on Chinese memory enterprises from EUV to DUV lithography machines, made by the Dutch company ASML but containing U.S. technologies. The bill even requires ASML and other foreign enterprises to obtain licenses before providing equipment maintenance services at restricted facilities in China.
Beyond suppressing competitors, Micron’s lobbying may also stem from past disputes with Chinese companies. In 2017, Micron accused Taiwan’s United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) of illegally stealing core memory trade secrets through technicians who had jumped from Micron and transferring them to Fujian Jinhua company. In 2018, the Trump administration placed Fujian Jinhua on the Entity List, completely banning U.S. companies from supplying any chip-related equipment or technology to it, effectively disrupting Fujian Jinhua’s production line construction. It wasn’t until late 2023 that Micron and Fujian Jinhua reached a global settlement, withdrawing all pending lawsuits. In February 2024, a U.S. court ruled that Fujian Jinhua was not guilty of criminal charges, finally closing the dispute.
4. How Does Chinese Law View Micron’s Above Conduct?
Though this lawsuit was filed in the U.S., the conventional memory modules involved in the case are widely used in Chinese computers and servers. Chinese computer manufacturers, smartphone producers, cloud service providers and end consumers are all victims of the monopolistic price hikes. Pursuant to Article 2 of the China Anti-Monopoly Law, monopolistic conduct occurring outside the territory of China that has a restrictive or exclusionary effect on competition in the domestic Chinese market is also subject to this Law. Therefore, China’s anti-monopoly regulatory authorities and judicial organs have jurisdiction over this matter.
Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, the three companies’ coordinated actions, including cutting conventional memory modules, shifting capacity to HBM, and others, constitute a horizontal monopoly agreement: an arrangement among competitors to restrict the production quantity or sales volume of goods.
However, a horizontal monopoly agreement requires proof of concerted action with mutual consent. China’s Anti-Monopoly Law also provides a lower threshold for proving monopoly through abuse of a dominant market position. The three companies’ combined share of the memory market exceeds 90%, surpassing the statutory threshold of three-quarters market share. Coupled with extremely high barriers to entry and the strong market power of existing manufacturers, they are deemed to have a dominant market position.
The three companies’ coordinated price hikes of conventional memory modules may constitute selling goods at unfair high prices. Meanwhile, Micron’s shutdown of its consumer-grade brand Crucial during the price surge, and their joint exit from the DDR4 product line, objectively amount to a de facto refusal to supply downstream markets, and also constitute refusal to deal without legitimate justification.
As for Micron’s lobbying of Congress to pass the MATCH Act and seeking to expand export control restrictions from EUV to DUV equipment, since the lobbying happens in the U.S. and targets U.S. lawmakers, it is not itself an independent illegal act under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law. However, it can serve as evidence that U.S. export controls objectively strengthen entry barriers in the high-end memory market, and that Micron’s lobbying aims to reinforce those barriers and maintain the existing dominant market structure of the three giants. This supports the claim that it holds and seeks to maintain a dominant position.
Separately, China also has the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which allows China to take countermeasures if the U.S. unjustifiably imposes discriminatory restrictions on Chinese memory firms. The relevant State Council departments may put individuals or organizations that directly or indirectly help formulate, decide, or enforce such measures on a counter-list. If the MATCH Act is passed, Micron’s conduct could be deemed as indirect participation in formulating, deciding, or implementing discriminatory restrictive measures, and China would have the right to impose sanctions on it. The most likely sanction would be to prohibit or restrict domestic organizations or individuals from engaging in transactions, cooperation, or other activities with Micron. If such countermeasures were imposed, Micron’s products would take another heavy hit in China, following the 2023 cybersecurity review by China’s Cyberspace Administration that resulted in a significant sales decline.
In short, facing the return of a monopoly specter that was once tamed in the memory industry, and conduct that uses foreign sanctions to harm China’s legitimate interests, Chinese memory companies can file civil litigation or file complaints with China’s anti-monopoly enforcement agencies under the Anti-Monopoly Law. For conduct falling under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, they can also seek legal remedies and counter-sanctions. Protecting rights through legal means is itself the most powerful response to those who seek competitive advantages through foreign restrictions.
Disclaimer of Bridge IP Law Commentary
Short Link: